WASHINGTON — As President George W. Bush's term comes to a close, the United States has the world's dominant economy and its most powerful military. Yet its global influence is in decline.

The United States emerged from the Cold War a solitary superpower whose political and economic leverage often enabled it to impose its will on others. Now, America usually needs to build coalitions — and often finds other world powers are not willing to go along.

In the 1990s, America exerted leadership in all the remote corners of the globe, from the southern cone of South America to Central Asia. Now, the United States has largely left the field in many regions, leaving others to show the way.

Bush has been widely blamed for the erosion of American prestige. And the decline in U.S. influence is partly the result of the reaction to his invasion of Iraq, his campaign against Islamic militants, and his early disdain for treaties and international bodies.

But the shift is also a result of independent forces, although hastened by an aversion to Bush. These include the steady ascent of China, India and other developing countries that throughout the past decade have amassed wealth and quietly extended their reach.

As smaller countries have built economic and political ties to these rising powers, they have worked to free themselves from exclusive dependence on the United States.

"There is no return to the time when the United States was the 'indispensable power,' " said Stewart Patrick, a former State Department official at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The world has moved on."

Now there are multiple power centers. The international institutions that buttressed Western power — such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund — are under pressure to allow rising powers more influence.

A vivid illustration of the power shift came Nov. 15, when Bush convened world leaders in Washington to lay plans for dealing with the global economic crisis. In the old days, experts said, he would have limited the meeting to a handful of major industrial powers. But Bush realized that the world economy now has a larger cast of influential players, and invited all members of the so-called Group of 20, which includes countries such as Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey.

A decade ago, the United States might have been able to bring enough economic pressure on its own to force an end to Iran's disputed nuclear program, said Nikolas K. Gvosdev, professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College.

But Iran by now has built economic ties to China and India, among others, so the United States has to assemble much larger group if it hopes to force Tehran's hand.

"Ten years ago, the U.S. was generally the only game in town, and it had the power to close or crack open the door to Iran," said Gvosdev. "Now other countries have more options. ... This doesn't mean the United States is weak, but it can't unilaterally impose what it wants."

A report this year by the U.S. National Intelligence Council cites a shift of economic power from the West to the East that is "without precedent." In 2025, the United States will "remain the single most powerful country, but will be less dominant," it said.

The United States has led since World War II in part by its power of persuasion, as well as its economic might. But other countries' unhappiness with the Iraq war and American conduct of the Bush administration's "war on terror," means that the "American brand is less legitimate, and its persuasive powers are compromised," said Charles Kupchan, of Georgetown University and the Council on Foreign Relations.

There has also been a dwindling of U.S. influence as the administration has focused most of its energy and resources on the Middle East and Southwest Asia, leaving much less for regions like Central and Southeast Asia and Latin America. Many regions are going their own way, developing new ties.

Latin American countries, for example, have begun building a regional organization called the Union of South American Nations, and a NATO-like defense alliance called the South American Defense Council. The United States, long dominant in the hemisphere, is pointedly excluded from both.

An 8-year-old group called the Shanghai Cooperation Council, including Russia, China, and four Central Asian states, has been slowly developing, in part because some members want a bulwark against future U.S. involvement in the region.

Other countries are now leading diplomatic initiatives that once would have been the province of the United States.

Qatar has taken the lead in brokering a deal between Syria and Lebanon, while Turkey has been acting as an intermediary between Israel and Egypt.

As U.S. political standing has eroded, the U.S. economy remains powerful. Its gross domestic product of $14 trillion a year still dwarfs China's $3 trillion.

Yet American influence on world economic policy is declining, too. One sign: the failure of the United States and its allies to sell a new agreement to the World Trade Organization in the face of opposition from China, India, and others.

"The influence of the U.S. private sector is as strong as ever," said Gary C. Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute of International Economics. "But the United States is much less able to shape world policy these days."

Many analysts expect the current economic crisis, which much of the world blames on the United States, will persuade many countries they shouldn't emulate the loosely regulated American economic model.

A particularly worrisome development from the U.S. perspective is the weakening of American ties with Europe. In the past, when the United States and the Europeans formed a common front on an issue, they had enormous leverage.

The United States and Europe have largely healed their rift over the Iraq war, but they remain divided on important issues, including climate change and Russia's resurgence.

Many analysts predict growing friction over the joint effort in Afghanistan. "There's a re-balancing of power away from the West," said Georgetown's Kupchan, "but also within the West."