Smokey Bear would frown if he saw the latest Los Alamos National Laboratory audit results from the Department of Energy Office of the Inspector General.
Workers from the office found that the lab was lax in fixing a series of fire-protection problems that had been identified in 2006. Out of 296 fire-protection deficiencies reviewed, auditors found that 174 — or 59 percent — had not been fixed.
Of those, 86 were considered significant enough that they represented non-compliance with fire protection standards and requirements.
And there could be more out there.
Los Alamos National Security LLC, which operates the lab for DOE, originally identified 812 fire protection deficiencies in a walk-down review conducted in early 2006 after it took over the lab management contract from the University of California.
The Inspector General's office reviewed only a sampling of those deficiencies in its report.
"Our examination disclosed that even though they had been identified more than two years prior to the commencement of our review, LANS had not taken action to address many significant deficiencies," said the audit report, which was written by Gregory H. Friedman, the inspector general.
One uncorrected problem, used as an example in the report, was in a kitchen hood fire suppression system used in the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center. The systems are required to be tested twice a year by the National Fire Protection Association.
In the 2006 walk-down, the LANS team noted that the system hadn't been inspected since May 2004, and that a problem with the system could result in "significantly high levels of property damage and loss," according to the report.
After auditors brought the issue to LANS' attention on Feb. 6 of this year, LANS officials said they'd fix the problem, which was still ongoing, the report said.
Auditors also found that in some cases, former contractor the University of California had said problems were fixed when they actually weren't. In one case, a walk-down team had categorized a fire alarm system as needing to be replaced, since it had been modified several times and was old and obsolete.
Action wasn't taken to fix the problem, but the "former contractor closed the recommendation in its action tracking database even though the panel had not been replaced," the report said.
Auditors found 32 similar incidents where problems were closed out when they weren't fixed, the report said.
"Perhaps most serious, our testing revealed that a number of deficiencies were formally closed even though actual corrective action had not been completed," the report said.
In a formal response to the report, Michael C. Kane, associate administrator for management and administration at the National Nuclear Security Administration, the agency that oversees the contractor and the lab, said he disagreed with several of the conclusions.
"Particularly noteworthy, the fire protection issues flagged were not nuclear safety issues, since the walk-downs did not focus on nuclear-safety-credited systems; such systems are the primary focus of NNSA fire protection oversight," Kane said in his letter. "Furthermore, consistent with its purpose, the due-diligence walk-down report provided a triage of the issues but not a detailed risk analysis and risk prioritization for the issues."
Kane blamed the problems on "weakness in institutional issue and corrective action management that existed in June 2006."
At that time, the lab didn't have a program to manage, prioritize or address the problems on a large scale or in a way in which they would not recur.
"Since June 2006, NNSA and LANS major focus has been to develop institutional issue management within the Contractor Assurance System, while also demonstrably improving the safety of the public, the workers and the environment in all areas, including fire protection," Kane's letter said.
Despite the arguments, however, NNSA agreed to work on recommendations from the audit. The recommendations were to establish clear expectations for LANS to correct existing fire protection problems and to verify the efficacy of LANS' corrective actions.
The auditors also recommended that NNSA establish funding plans and schedules for fixing all of the problems, that it track the status of the highly significant fire protection deficiencies and that it validate the efficacy of corrective actions before closing them out.
"NNSA agrees with the recommendations that are being presented because quality assurance can always be strengthened," Kane's letter said.
For the full report, visit
tinyurl.com/lanlaudit on the Web.
Contact Sue Vorenberg at svorenberg@sfnewmexican.com.